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Abstract 
We hypothesize that one way that accounting practices spread is through law firm connections.  
We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation 
expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that executives engaged in 
backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness when they learned through 
their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this practice. We identify backdating 
companies through backdating-related restatements of earnings. Using network analysis, we 
document that backdating companies are more highly connected with other backdating 
companies via shared law firms. Logistic regressions indicate that the odds of a company 
backdating are 53 to 88 percent higher when its law firm has another client that backdates. We 
find that sharing a law firm is incremental to the impact of board interlocks and geographic 
location for explaining backdating. Finally, we document that law firms that have more clients 
that restate earnings due to backdating also have more other clients that are “lucky” (grant 
options at low prices).  This suggests that other client companies also engaged in backdating but 
were not required to restate. Our evidence is consistent with law firms acting as “system 
supporters” in enabling executives to engage in backdating.   
Keywords: accounting practices, stock options, backdating, law firms, directors, geographic 
location, network analysis 
JEL Classifications: J33, K22, K42, L14, M41, M43, M45 
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How Do Accounting Practices Spread?  






We hypothesize that one way that accounting practices spread is through law firm 
connections.  We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting 
compensation expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that 
executives engaged in backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness 
when they learned through their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this 
practice. We identify backdating companies through backdating-related restatements of 
earnings. Using network analysis, we document that backdating companies are more highly 
connected with other backdating companies via shared law firms. Logistic regressions 
indicate that the odds of a company backdating are 53 to 88 percent higher when its law firm 
has another client that backdates. We find that sharing a law firm is incremental to the impact 
of board interlocks and geographic location for explaining backdating. Finally, we document 
that law firms that have more clients that restate earnings due to backdating also have more 
other clients that are “lucky” (grant options at low prices).  This is consistent with other client 
companies also engaging in backdating but not being required to restate. Our evidence is 
consistent with law firms acting as “system supporters” in enabling executives to engage in 
backdating.   
Keywords: accounting practices, stock options, backdating, law firms, directors, geographic 
location, network analysis 




Accounting practices evolve through time as the nature of business transactions change.  
Much of the details of accounting practices are not written down in formal rules by rule-
making bodies such as the FASB.  Instead, companies make detailed choices for themselves.  
Research evidence suggests that when individuals make decisions they use their own 
judgment but this judgment is influenced by the opinion of experts and the consensus opinion 
of peers.1  Within the institutional framework of accounting this suggests that when corporate 
executives make accounting choices they are influenced by their own judgment, the opinion 
of experts such as their auditor and legal counsel, and the choices made by peer companies.   
The objective of our paper is to provide insight into how accounting practices spread. 
There are many examples of what appear to be “bad” accounting practices growing in 
popularity until regulators put an end to the practice.  These include the structuring of M&A 
deals to meet “pooling of interest” requirements; the structuring of deals to write-off in-
process R&D; the structuring securitizations to keep special purpose entities off the books; 
and the structuring of leases as operating leases.  How exactly do these practices gain 
momentum and acceptability and is there a way that such acceptability could be reversed 
without regulation?  Better understanding the answer to these questions could help auditors 
                                                
1 Milgram (1974) in a famous experiment, had subjects administer electric shocks to a confederate who acted as 
if in considerable pain.  The subjects continued to give the shocks when the experimenters (who they believed 
were experts) told the subjects no permanent tissue damage would occur.  This was interpreted as the power of 
authority on the human mind.  An information-based interpretation of this finding is that the subjects assumed, 
based on prior experience, that the experts knew what they were doing.  Milgram found weaker results when 
subjects thought the experimenters were not experts.  Asch (1952) did experiments where the subject had to 
guess the length of line segments and a group of confederates unanimously gave the wrong answer.  He found 
that a third of the time the subjects caved in and gave the wrong answer, and explained the results as due to 
social pressure. The results in Deutsch and Gerard (1955) suggest that another interpretation is that the subjects 
were reacting to the knowledge that a large group of people had reached a judgment different from theirs and, 
based on prior experience, assumed that the group was almost certainly right.  See also the discussion in Shiller 
(2015, Chapter 10) on herd behavior. 
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and rule-making bodies reverse bad trends in accounting choices before the necessity of rule 
changes, regulation, or punishment.  
The spread of any particular accounting practice is likely to be contextual and in this 
paper, we focus on the role of law firms in the stock option backdating scandal. We believe 
this setting has several advantages for conducting our research.  First, stock option backdating 
occurred for several years without public knowledge.  This suggests that the practice spread 
through inter-company networks, and so increases the reliability of the results we find when 
analyzing the relation between law firm networks and backdating. Second, backdating 
companies were required to restate their earnings in years when the backdating occurred.  This 
allows us to both identify companies that have backdated and identify the years in which the 
backdating occurred.  It also allows us to determine the timing of the backdating relative to 
other companies in the law firm network.  Finally, we are able to identify the law firm that 
provided legal counsel to the company through Form S-8 filings.  Form S-8 registers 
securities that can be used in employee-based compensation plans, and includes an opinion of 
counsel on the legality on the securities issued (see SEC 2015, p. 9).  Therefore, we can 
identify the law firm that counseled the company on its stock compensation plans and the 
years in which it did so. 
We contend that there was ambiguity in the accounting rules (APB 25) surrounding the 
exact meaning of the term “measurement date” for stock option grants. This ambiguity 
allowed flexibility in the interpretation of the grant date and likely led to compensation 
committees or executives relying on the advice of experts (auditors, attorneys, or 
compensation consultants) or peers (other directors or executives) in determining the grant 
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date. 2  Our study focusses on the role of the external counsel and we hypothesize that because 
the external counsel plays an active role in setting up employee stock plans, they could also 
have played a role in spreading the practice of backdating through informal discussion with 
executives and directors concerning the measurement date choices made by other clients.  As 
a consequence, executives could have engaged in backdating because they were desensitized 
to its inappropriateness after learning that other companies were engaging in this practice.  In 
other words, the executive’s judgment was affected by the fact that, on average, experts tend 
to be correct, and when a large group of people come to a judgment it is likely to be correct.  
Of course, self-interest plays a role, but self-interest is not the only influential factor in 
decision making.  
We identify a company as a backdating company if it restates earnings to record stock 
option expense. We examine whether backdating companies are unusually highly clustered to 
one another via law firm links (to avoid confusion we use the word “firm” in reference to a 
law firm and “company” for a business entity). To do so, we construct networks each year 
where nodes represent companies and a link from one company to another represents a law 
firm link over which backdating could have propagated by the end of the year. We examine 
the extent to which companies are connected to one another via law firm links, for backdating 
companies compared to the same number of randomly-chosen companies, based on 10,000 
simulations per year. We find that backdating companies are more highly clustered than 95% 
of randomly-chosen samples of companies each year. 
                                                
2 See, Milliron and Weil (2017) for a discussion of the ambiguity with the accounting rules, and Perlis and 
Johnson (2007, p. 9) who suggest that experts such as auditors, compensation consultants and the legal counsel 
were likely to have been consulted by boards. 
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Next, we provide regression analyses to determine whether a company is more likely to 
backdate options in a given year when it is represented by a law firm that had represented a 
backdating company. Using a sample of 13,912 company-years between 1997 and 2006 in 
which stock options were granted, we define a LawFirmLink variable that reflects whether a 
company is represented by a law firm that currently or previously represented another client 
company in a year that it backdated options. We use several variations of the LawFirmLink 
variable based on the period the linked company’s backdating occurred, and several 
specifications with and without matching.  We find that the odds of a company backdating are 
53 to 88 percent higher when it is linked to another backdating company via shared law firms 
than when it is not, ceteris paribus.  
We also examine the distribution of backdating companies across law firms, and show that 
they are concentrated in certain law firms.  Among the 23 larger law firms (those with over 40 
option-granting clients) the proportion of clients that backdate range from zero to about 
fourteen percent and the difference in proportions is significant (p < 5%). In contrast, for the 
eight larger audit firms (with over 40 option-granting clients), the difference is not significant 
(p = 36.3%), and the proportions range from 1.4 to 3.7 percent. This evidence is 
circumstantial, but suggests that some law firms were more actively involved with backdating 
clients than other law firms.  In contrast, it appears that none of the larger audit firms were 
heavily involved, since we find no statistical evidence of clustering of backdating clients in 
specific audit firms. 
We provide two additional tests that provide further insight into the role of law firms in 
backdating.  Our first test examines the direction of causality. We predict that companies learn 
about backdating from their law firms, but an alternative explanation is that companies that 
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wish to engage in backdating switch to law firms that have backdating clients. We analyze 
companies that change law firms, but find no support for the “switching” story. Our second 
test examines whether law firms with backdating clients are more likely to have other client 
companies that could have also been backdating.  Prior literature argues that “lucky” grant 
dates are likely to be correlated with backdating (Lie 2005).  We document that law firms with 
more backdating clients also have a higher proportion of other client companies with “lucky” 
grant dates. This is consistent with law firms spreading the practice of backdating but only 
some clients being forced to restate.   
Our results contribute to the literature in two ways.  First, to date, there has been little 
research on the influence of law firms on financial reporting quality.  Hopkins, Maydew, and 
Venkatachalam (2014) suggest that highly compensated in-house legal counsel allow more 
aggressive accounting but also act as gatekeepers in keeping the company in compliance with 
GAAP.  Our paper examines the role of the outside legal counsel and suggests that they also 
appear to play a role in financial reporting quality.  Our results suggest that law firms were 
either observers or system supporters in enabling executives to engage in backdating.3   These 
results suggest that outside legal services can potentially spread both good and bad accounting 
practices across companies.   
Second, our paper builds on research that examines whether accounting quality is spread 
via social networks.  Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) provide evidence that a company is more 
likely to restate earnings when it shares a director with another company that restates 
                                                
3 Westaby (2012 p.5 and p.33) in his discussion of network theory, describes observers as playing a peripheral 
role - they are entities that observe (or are aware of) the people involved in goal pursuit; system supporters are 
entities that support others in goal pursuit and improve the likelihood of goal success. 
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earnings. Their results suggest that board of directors’ networks influence accounting quality.  
Several studies have specifically focused on the spread of stock option backdating. Armstrong 
and Larcker (2009) and Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) identify companies with “lucky” 
grant dates (option granted when the stock price is low) and assume that these companies 
engaged in backdating.  The analysis in both papers suggest that board members spread the 
practice of backdating. Bizjak et. al. (2009) and Sivadasan (2010) further suggest that sharing 
geographic locations increases the likelihood of backdating. We argue that since external law 
firms are directly involved in structuring employee compensation plans, they are in a unique 
and influential position for potentially spreading the practice.  Our evidence suggests that law 
firm connections are incremental to director links and geographic location in explaining stock 
option backdating.    
2. STOCK OPTION BACKDATING 
The literature on the practice of stock option backdating began with a line of research that 
uncovered evidence that stock option awards were timed favorably, that is they tended to 
occur on days with low stock prices relative to the days before or after the grant date. 
Yermack (1997) finds that companies have cumulative abnormal returns of over two percent 
over the 50 trading days following CEO stock option grants. He finds weaker evidence of 
negative cumulative abnormal returns in the 20 days before the award date. Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) find evidence that companies with fixed stock options award schedules “time” 
the option award date by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. Lie (2005) finds 
that the effect is greater for unscheduled awards, and proposed that “at least some of the 
awards are timed retroactively” (p. 802).  Heron and Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun 
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(2008) provide further evidence suggesting that backdating contributed to favorable option 
grant timing. 
Following Lie (2005), an investigation by the Wall Street Journal that broke in March 
2006 brought the practice of option backdating to the attention of the public, and 24 class 
action lawsuits relating to options backdating were filed in 2006 alone (Cornerstone Research 
2008).4  By 2007 the SEC was investigating “well over 100 backdating cases” (SEC 2007) 
and the Wall Street Journal’s Options Scorecard had over 140 companies listed as having 
“come under scrutiny for past stock-option grants and practices” (WSJ 2007).   
The companies accused of stock option backdating faced significant negative 
consequences. The first announcement of a backdating allegation is associated with negative 
abnormal returns of approximately seven percent over the trading days leading up to and 
around the announcement (Bernile and Jarrell 2009; see also Carow, Heron, Lie, and Neal 
2009).  In addition, CEOs and CFOs are more than three times more likely to face forced 
dismissals in backdating companies than matching control companies (Efendi, Files, Ouyang, 
and Swanson 2013, p. 86). 5  There is a clear alternative accounting practice to backdating, 
which is simply to recognize an expense for the difference between the current market price 
and the exercise price.  Why did so many companies choose to select the suboptimal 
accounting choice of backdating?  Researchers have suggested that tax-related incentives can 
increase the likelihood of backdating (Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman 2009); as does poor 
                                                
4 See the Wall Street Journal, “The Perfect Payday” (Forelle and Bandler 2006) and “How the Journal Analyzed 
Stock-Option Grants” (Forelle 2006). The Wall Street Journal was awarded the 2007 Pulitzer Prize in Public 
Service for its investigation into stock option backdating. 
5 In addition, Edelson and Whisenant (2009) develop a measure of undisclosed backdaters and suggest that these 
companies also suffered negative consequences.  See also Maremont 2009 and the New York Times, “Behind the 
Fade-Out of Options Backdating Cases” (Henning 2010) and “End of the Options Backdating Era” (Henning 
2013). 
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corporate governance (e.g., Collins, Gong, and Li 2009 and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer 
2010) and the potential trade-off between cash compensation and options (Veld and Wu 
2009).   Although these incentives are likely to play a role in the decision to backdate, they do 
not explain how backdating spread.  Our hypothesis is that backdating executives were 
desensitized to their poor judgment when they learned from their legal counsel that other 
companies were engaged in backdating.  In other words, executives "herded" to backdating 
because they relied too heavily on the opinion of experts and the knowledge that peer 
companies had engaged in the practice.  
Consultations with the external legal counsel is not the only way that backdating is likely 
to have spread.  Prior research suggests that backdating could also have spread through shared 
directorships or through communication between executives in the same geographic location 
(e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon, and Witby (2009) and Sivadasan 2010).  Bizjak, Lemmon, and Witby 
(2009) argue that director links between companies allow the knowledge of the practice of 
backdating to spread between companies.  They classify an option grant as backdated if the 
difference between post-grant and pre-grant stock returns exceeds a cutoff level based on a 
random sample of trading days.  They find using logistic regressions that the odds of starting 
to backdate option grants is significantly positively associated with having a board member 
who is on the board of a backdating company.   Similarly, Armstrong and Larcker (2009) 
argue that “backdating may be the result of social influence” (p. 51) in the sense that 
backdating by a linked company helps to legitimize the practice in the focal company.  Using 
a sample of 140 companies identified as backdating by the Wall Street Journal, Armstrong 
and Larcker (2009) find that backdating companies are more connected to one another via 
board interlocks compared to a simulated distribution of the degree of connectedness in 
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randomly-drawn samples of non-backdating companies.  They suggest that “boards of 
directors may be an important part of the social mechanism related to the diffusion and 
justification of backdating behavior” (p. 54). 6   We view this line of research as 
complementary to ours, and investigate whether law firm networks are incrementally 
informative in explaining backdating over board interlocks and geographic location for our 
sample of company-years. 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
When a company registers securities to be issued under employee benefit plans, 
Regulation S-K requires an “opinion of counsel as to the legality of the securities being 
registered” for original issuance securities (SEC 2015, p. 9).  The opinion is typically included 
in the registration as Exhibit 5 or 5.1, and states that the securities will be validly issued, fully 
paid, and non-assessable.7  The close involvement of legal counsel in stock option plans raises 
the question: could law firms have played a role in the practice of stock option backdating?  
For example, in a recent trial of a CEO convicted for his role in option backdating, the CEO’s 
attorney alleged that the external counsel “signed off on the company’s backdating of stock 
options”, although the judge “expressed no interest in passing off blame to [the company’s] 
outside counsel” (Koppel 2010).  
                                                
6 Two studies have examined the role of board interlocks in the spread of aggressive tax reporting. Brown (2011) 
finds that the adoption of the corporate-owned life insurance shelter spreads via board interlocks, and Brown and 
Drake (2014) find that companies with board interlocks with companies with relatively low effective tax rates 
have lower effective tax rates themselves.  
7 See American Bar Association (2004) for a summary of the legal opinions in SEC filings. 
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Prior research has not directly examined the impact of law firms on the propagation of the 
practice of backdating. Bizjak et al. (2009, 4843) discuss the possibility that law firms or 
compensation consultants could be another way that backdating spread but argue:  
“The fact that no outside counsels or compensation consultants have been targeted for 
action suggests that they might not have played a prominent role in the spread of this 
practice across companies.”   
However, the SEC focuses enforcement actions against officers of the company since these 
are the individuals responsible for the reporting.  A lack of litigation does not necessarily 
imply law firms were not involved.8  In addition, Perlis and Johnson (2007) point out that 
companies may not have taken legal action against “experts” because the executives’ D&O 
insurance may have prohibited this action (allowing the D&O to take the action instead).   
If backdating spread via law firms, it should have left observable evidence in the structure 
of the law firm links between backdating companies.  We provide two predictions:   
P1: Backdating companies are unusually highly clustered to one another via law firm 
links, relative to randomly-selected companies. 
P2: A company is more likely to backdate stock options if it is represented by a law 
firm that currently or previously represented another company in a year during which 
it backdated options. 
We test P1 using network analysis and P2 using logistic regressions.  
                                                
8 We identified 27 firms that faced SEC Enforcement actions for backdating stock options in the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases database (see Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011).  We found that the majority 
of cases involved the CFO or CEO.  Non-executive independent directors were sued in only three of the firms.  
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4. SAMPLE AND DATA 
We identify backdating companies using AuditAnalytics’ Non-Reliance Restatements 
database. We restrict the data to restatements involving option backdating (category 48 in 
AuditAnalytics), and define a company’s backdating period as the period for which the 
company is restating (res_begin_date to res_end_date). A company-year is defined as 
backdating if it overlaps with the company’s backdating period. Figure 1 provides the 
distribution of the start and end years of the backdating periods for the 123 backdating 
companies in our sample. The median (average) company backdated for six (seven) years 
(untabulated).  The frequency of backdating increased gradually from the mid-1990s, but most 
firms had stopped by 2006, around the time Wall Street Journal brought the practice to the 
attention of the public (see Forelle and Bandler 2006 and Forelle 2006). 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
We next construct a sample of company-years with at-the-money CEO grants, and identify 
the law firms that represented the company each year. Table 1 Panel A describes our sample 
construction. Because EDGAR filing only became mandatory for all US public firms in 1996, 
we construct links between companies and law firms based on data beginning in 1996, and 
begin our sample in 1997 to allow for at least one prior year of data. Our sample period ends 
in 2006, around the time option backdating was brought to the attention of the public and the 
practice became less frequent. We also require availability of PERMNO and CIK, resulting in 
a sample of 71,117 company-years. 
We next require the company to have issued stock options during the year. Consistent with 
prior research (e.g. Heron and Lie, 2007; Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008; Edelson and 
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Whisenant, 2009; Collins et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010) we identify option grants using 
the Thomson Reuters Insider Filings database.9  We require the availability of either CUSIP or 
ticker to facilitate merging with other datasets. We also omit option grants that are not at-the-
money by requiring each grant’s exercise price to be within one percent of the closing price of 
the grant date or the trading day before the grant date.10  This results in a sample of 34,715 
company-years during which stock options were issued at-the-money. We further restrict the 
data to stock option grants to CEOs and remove scheduled grants under the assumption that 
backdating can only occur when the grant date is unscheduled.11 This reduces the sample to 
18,591 company-years. Finally, we require closing stock prices to be available for the grant 
date and at least ten days on either side of the grant date in order to construct luck-based 
measures of options backdating. This leaves us with 18,505 company-year observations for 
our 1997 to 2006 sample period. 
We next link each company to the law firm that had represented it in its Form S-8 filings 
using Lexis Securities Mosaic’s Law Firm Relationships database. Lexis obtains its data from 
SEC filings, which all US public companies were required to file electronically beginning in 
1996.  The database provides information on the filing date of each Form S-8 along with the 
name of the law firm associated with the filing, and company identifiers.12  We first check the 
                                                
9 The Compustat variable optgr also captures stock option grants, but is only available from 2001. The Insider 
Filings database is based on SEC Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. We use Table 2, which includes data on option grants 
and exercises. We restrict the data to observations with cleanse indicators other than “A” or “S”, which are 
labeled as problematic records in WRDS, and we remove records labeled as amendments. 
10 If the exercise price is within one percent of the closing price on the eve of the grant date and not the grant date 
itself, we use the former as the grant date. 
11 A scheduled grant is defined as a CEO grant within one day of the anniversary of a CEO grant in the previous 
year.  We require the derivative to be coded as a type of stock option (derivative type DIREO, DIRO, EMPO, 
ISO, NONQ, CALL, or OPTNS), the transaction to be an acquisition rather than a disposition, and the insider to 
be coded as a CEO or President (Role Code CEO or P). 
12 In the case of Form S-8 filings, the law firm recorded by Lexis are usually the ones that provide the Exhibit 5 
or 5.1 opinions. We restrict the data to form types coded by Lexis Securities Mosaic as S-8, S-8 POS or S-8/A, 
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first date and last date a given law firm is associated with a given company.  The first date is 
the first S-8 filing recorded in the database and the last date is the most recent Form S-8 filing.  
If a company’s last Form S-8 is before the end of our sample period (e.g., 2004), then we 
assume that its relationship with the law firm named in the filing extends to the end of our 
sample period (i.e., 2006).13   We are able to obtain law firm links for 13,721 company-years 
directly from Lexis. The remaining company-year observations were either not included in 
Lexis at all, or were cases where the company’s first Form S-8 was filed after the relevant 
company-year.  For these remaining company-years, we collect the law firm name by hand 
based on the most recent Form S-8 filing from EDGAR. We are able to hand-collect law firms 
directly from the SEC EDGAR database for 1,515 additional company-year observations.  
This results in us obtaining law firm links for 15,236 company years.14   
For each company-year, we calculate the time elapsed since the most recent Form S-8 
filing in our dataset.  The results (untabulated) indicate that the average (median) elapsed time 
is 583 days (386 days) and the 10th and 90th percentiles are 78 days and 1,368 days 
respectively. In other words, for half of the observations, the time that elapsed between the S-
8 filing and the company’s fiscal year-end was about a year. At the company level, the 
average elapsed time between the last year the company appears in the sample and the 
company’s last S-8 filing is 675 days (median = 455 days). We require availability of 
                                                                                                                                                   
and we standardize the law firm names, for example by removing punctuation and suffixes such as “PC” and 
“LLP”. We use the EDGAR index files to obtain the companies’ CIK numbers because the data identifies filings 
by accession number. 
13 We rerun our results after omitting observations for which the time between S-8 filing and the year-end is 
greater than three years, and find that our inferences are unchanged. 
14 After applying this procedure. the majority (95.9%) of the 15,236 company-years are linked to only one law 
firm during the year. The remaining 4.1% of company-years may have multiple law firms per year either because 
they filed separate Forms S-8 with different law firms, or because of the small number of S-8 filings (3.8%) 
coded by Lexis Securities Mosaic as having multiple law firms. Our inferences are unchanged when we omit 
company-years linked to more than one law firm. 
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variables used in the regressions, which reduces the sample to 13,912 company-years. We run 
the regressions using three different specifications: without matching, and using two different 
propensity matching methods. Our primary inferences are unchanged across all three 
specifications. For brevity, we only report results based on matching the characteristics of 
backdating and non-backdating companies (Section 6.2 provides more details on our matching 
methodology). After applying the matching procedure, the sample is reduced to 10,312 
company-years.   
Panel B of Table 1 reconciles the initial 171 unique companies that restated earnings due 
to backdating as reported on AuditAnalytics, to the 141 unique backdating companies we 
identify that have at-the-money option grants.  
 [Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel C of Table 1 provides the sample examining the impact of board interlocks.  We 
obtain board member data from the Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics) 
database on WRDS. We use the Directors Legacy file that covers the period 1996 to 2006. 
The data comprises board membership information for the calendar years in which 
companies’ annual meetings occurred.15  We merge the data with our sample of company-
years, assigning board members to company-year observations by CUSIP, and assuming that 
a director is on a company’s board throughout the fiscal year during which the annual meeting 
occurred.  Because the database covers directors in the S&P 1500, our sample size is reduced 
                                                
15 We remove observations where the year is different from the year of the annual meeting (meetingdate), and 
observations where legacy_director_id-cusip-meetingdate is duplicated. We use the legacy director ID 
(legacy_director_id) as the director identifier instead of the current director ID (director_detail_id), in 
accordance with the WRDS KnowledgeBase’s recommendation to use the most populated director ID for the 
sample period. 
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by about 66 percent for the board interlocks tests.  A similar decline in sample size is also 
noted by Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) who use the same data source.  After constructing the 
director links and merging the data with the sample, we obtain a sample of 4,671 company-
years for the board interlocks tests. The sample size is further reduced to 3,776 company-
years after matching. 
Panel D of Table 1 provides our sample for tests examining geographic links.  We restrict 
the sample to companies headquartered (Compustat: loc) in the United States and require data 
on the companies’ city and state (Compustat: city and state). This results in a sample of 
13,707 company-years comprising 4,671 unique companies. After matching, the sample size 
is further reduced to 10,186 company-years. Figure 2 provides the proportions of the 4,671 
companies (in light blue) and the 119 that backdated (in red) in the 15 states with the largest 
proportions of companies in the sample. California has the largest proportion of sample 
companies (20.8%), followed by Texas (8.9%).  Approximately 49.6% of backdating 
companies are headquartered in California. We include a dummy variable, !"#$%&'($")* in 
our regressions to control for this clustering. 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
5. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
5.1 Descriptive Evidence on Law Firms’ Clients 
Table 2 Panel A provides data on the relationship between backdating and law firm size, 
based on the sample of 5,159 companies with law firm data available. Here we define law 
firm size as the number of sample companies a law firm represented over our sample period. 
The panel indicates that there are a large number of small law firms that represented five or 
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fewer companies (812 of 1,080, or 75.2% of unique law firms) and a small number of large 
law firms that represented more than 40 companies (23 of 1,080, or 2.1% of unique law 
firms). Columns 3 and 4 provide the number and percentage of law firms that have backdating 
clients in each group. Of the 812 smallest law firms, 21 or 2.6% had clients that backdated. As 
the size of a law firm increases, the probability that it had a backdating client increases. Thus, 
of the 23 largest law firms, 20 or 87.0% had backdating clients. Columns 5 to 7 concern the 
probability that a given client backdated during the sample period. About 2.4% of unique 
companies backdated, and the proportion is highest (4.3%) for the clients of the largest law 
firms.16 
For comparison, we provide information on the auditors of companies in our sample and 
the proportion of each audit firm’s clients that backdated. Table 2 Panel B shows the number 
and proportion of unique clients that backdated during the sample period while represented by 
the eight audit firms with more than 40 clients in the sample and by other audit firms, 
respectively. We drop observations without auditor data from Compustat or that were 
unaudited. Among the Big 5 audit firms, the proportion of clients that backdated range from 
1.4% (Arthur Andersen) to 3.3% (Deloitte & Touche). 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
If the practice of backdating spread via law firms, we would expect backdating companies 
to be more concentrated in certain law firms than others. Figure 3 Panel A shows the 
proportion of each large law firm’s clients that backdated during the sample period. We 
                                                
16 In Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A and Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B, the number of clients per bin may not sum to 
the total number of clients because a company may be linked to multiple law firms and audit firms. 
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compare this against large audit firms in Panel B. The proportion varies widely within large 
law firms, from 0% to 13.8%, and the difference in proportions is significant, with a p-value 
of 2.0%. On the other hand, the proportion is not significantly different between large audit 
firms at conventional significance levels (p-value = 36.3%). In Panels C and D, we restrict the 
analyses to companies in California, the state with the most backdaters in our sample. We find 
large variation in the proportion of law firms’ clients that backdated (p-value = 10.5%), while 
the proportion is similar across audit firms (p-value = 96.4%). These results suggest that 
certain large law firms were more involved with the practice of backdating than others. In 
contrast, backdating clients appear randomly distributed among large audit firms. 
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
5.2 Law Firm Network Results 
Network analysis has been used in epidemiological studies to examine the role of social 
connections. Christakis and Fowler (2007), for example, find that obesity spreads via 
friendship and family links. Rosenquist, Murabito, Fowler, and Christakis (2010) find that 
alcohol consumption by friends and relatives is associated with a person's alcohol 
consumption.  In this paper, instead of people, we focus on companies, and instead of the 
spread of disease or alcohol, we focus on the spread of option backdating via law firms. 
We use two network algorithms to visually display the evidence: the Kamada and Kawai 
(1989) and Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) algorithms. Both algorithms position nodes 
based on their connections with other nodes: the former is based on the shortest paths between 
nodes, while the latter is based on modeling attractive forces between connected nodes and 
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repulsive forces between unconnected nodes. The size of each node is based on company size, 
defined as the natural logarithm of beginning market value. 
Figure 4 depicts the law firm links between companies that backdated at any time in our 
sample period. In Panel A, the network is drawn based on the Kamada and Kawai (1989) 
algorithm, and in Panel B, it is drawn based on the Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) 
algorithm. Each node represents one of the 123 unique backdating companies, and a link from 
node i to node j indicates that a law firm link from i to j existed at some point during the 
sample period.  In other words, during one of j’s fiscal years t, it had at least one law firm that 
represented i at t or earlier. Figure 4 indicates that the network is highly clustered, with a large 
subcomponent comprising companies that are connected to one another, and several small 
subcomponents and unconnected nodes.17 There are 69 companies (56.1%) in the largest 
subcomponent, and 6 (4.9%) in the second-largest subcomponent. 
[Please insert Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 examines the propagation of backdating over time. We focus on the largest 
component of the network drawn using the Kamada-Kawai layout in Panel A of Figure 4, and 
report the networks every second year starting in 1997. For each network diagram, we restrict 
the nodes to companies that had entered the sample by the corresponding year, and color 
nodes red if the company had backdated by then and light blue otherwise. The law firm links 
between companies are constructed based on data up to each year. We observe that from 
                                                
17 A component of a network comprises a set of nodes that are connected to each other via one or more links. 
This includes nodes linked via other nodes: if node i is linked to j and j is linked to k, nodes i and k are in the 
same component. Here and elsewhere in the paper, we ignore the direction of the links when deciding whether 
two nodes are in the same component. 
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2003, the only companies that have not backdated are outside the highly connected central 
cluster. 
[Please insert Figure 5 about here] 
In the remainder of this section we provide a more formal examination of whether 
backdating companies are unusually clustered via the law firm links. Table 3A provides 
descriptive statistics on the networks each year between 1997 and 2001 and Table 3B between 
2002 and 2006. Panel A of the tables indicates that there are substantially more links than 
companies, and that the number of companies and links peak in 2001. The large number of 
links relative to companies is due to law firms having multiple clients and companies using 
the services of more than one law firm.  The mean number of law firms per link is close to 
one, suggesting that if one company is linked to another it is generally via only one law firm.  
Panel B of Tables 3A and 3B present characteristics of subsets of the network each year. 
The initial increase in the relative size of the largest component of the network is likely 
because the law firm links are constructed based on data beginning in 1996. In later years, a 
company’s law firm would be more likely to have represented another company in the sample 
at some point since 1996. Beginning in 2001, the largest components of the networks each 
year comprise more than 60% of the companies that year. 
Panels C of Tables 3A and 3B present descriptive statistics on the in-degree distribution of 
backdating and non-backdating companies respectively, each year. The in-degree of a given 
node is the number of other nodes that link to the given node. For example, the mean in-
degree for non-backdating companies of 14.1 in 2000 indicates that, on average, a non-
backdating company’s law firm has had 14.1 other clients in the data. The smaller median in-
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degree every year is consistent with there being several law firms with large client bases. The 
mean in-degree of backdating companies is significantly greater than that of non-backdating 
companies in all years, except the first.  For example, in 2000 the mean in-degrees for non-
backdating and backdating companies were 14.1 and 33.4 respectively. This suggests that 
backdating companies tend to be represented by larger law firms that have had more clients 
that issue options.  
[Please insert Table 3A and 3B about here] 
While Tables 3A and 3B provide evidence of differences in the in-degrees of backdating 
and non-backdating companies within the full network, Table 4 provides evidence of 
abnormal clustering between backdating companies. Beginning with the sample of 15,236 
company-years with law firm data, each year we compute measures of clustering between 
backdating companies, and compare those measures to the simulated distribution of clustering 
between the same number of randomly-selected companies. We use two measures of the 
extent of clustering: the clustering coefficient, and the shortest path between nodes, as defined 
below. 
Mean clustering coefficient. For a given node i, the clustering coefficient measures 
the extent to which the nodes that are connected to i are connected to each other (Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998; Barrat et al., 2004).18 For example, if all companies shared the 
same law firm at t, they would each have a clustering coefficient of 1. For this measure 
we ignore the directions of the links. Isolated nodes and nodes that are linked with 
                                                
18 More precisely, the clustering coefficient for a given node is defined as follows. (Watts and Strogatz 1998, p. 
441) If a given node i is linked from or to k other nodes, the maximum number of undirected links that could 
exist between the k nodes is +(+-.)0 . The clustering coefficient for node i is then the proportion of the +(+-.)0  links 
that exist. 
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only one other node are assigned clustering coefficients of zero. Following Watts and 
Strogatz (1998), we use the average clustering coefficient over all nodes in a network.  
Mean shortest path. Analogous to Armstrong and Larcker (2009), we measure the 
minimum number of law firm links needed to reach one company from another. We 
consider only directed paths between nodes, and if two companies are not linked at all, 
the shortest path between them is defined as the longest possible path through the 
network plus one.19  We use the average shortest path over all possible directed paths 
between unique companies in the network.20  
We illustrate the computation of the mean clustering coefficient and mean shortest path 
using a simple network in Exhibit 1. 
[Please insert Exhibit 1 about here] 
To test prediction P1, each year we compare the mean clustering coefficient and the mean 
shortest path of the network of backdating companies against their empirical distributions 
from 10,000 simulations of same-sized networks. For a given year, each simulated network is 
constructed by drawing the same number of random companies as backdating companies, and 
the mean clustering coefficient and shortest path are computed for the network. The process is 
repeated 10,000 times each year to construct the simulated distributions of the mean clustering 
coefficient and shortest path. To mitigate the impact of differences between backdating and 
non-backdating companies, non-backdating companies with market capitalization beyond the 
                                                
19 A directed path is a set of links between nodes that are in the same direction; for example, ijk is a directed 
path from i to k but ijk is not. We note that the links may not be transitive (i.e. ijk does not necessarily 
imply ik) because law firm representation may change over time for a given company. 
20 Unlike Armstrong and Larcker (2009), we do not use the median shortest path because a large proportion of 
the pairs of companies are not linked at all, particularly in the randomly-selected samples: in our networks the 
median distance between two companies would often be infinite. This difference between our networks and the 
networks reported in Armstrong and Larcker (2009) suggest that companies are less clustered to one another via 
shared law firms than shared directors. 
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first and third quartile of the market capitalization of backdating companies at the start of each 
year are omitted before the random selection (results are similar without this restriction). 21  
Table 4 presents the results of the simulation. The shaded columns on the left present the 
mean clustering coefficient and shortest path for the networks of backdating companies each 
year, and the unshaded columns on the right present the distributions of both measures from 
10,000 simulations of same-sized networks comprising randomly-selected companies each 
year.  The results suggest that backdating companies are significantly more highly clustered to 
one another via law firm links relative to randomly-selected companies. Panel A indicates that 
in every year the mean clustering coefficient among backdating companies is greater than that 
of at least 95% of the networks constructed from randomly-selected companies.   Panel B 
indicates that every year the mean shortest path among backdating companies is less than that 
of at least 95% of the networks constructed from randomly-selected companies.  This 
evidence is consistent with backdating companies being more closely connected to each other.   
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
We provide a graphical representation of the findings in Table 4 in Figure 6.  Figure 6 
presents diagrams of the networks for the three years with the largest numbers of backdating 
companies, alongside same-sized networks of companies chosen randomly from the sample in 
the same year. Nodes shaded in dark red correspond to companies that backdated and nodes in 
light blue with darker outlines indicate companies that did not backdate that year. We observe 
qualitatively from the layout of the nodes that backdating companies are highly clustered to 
                                                
21  The mean clustering coefficient and shortest paths are computed in R using the transitivity and 
mean_distance functions from the igraph package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006).  For both measures, we assign 
each link the same weight. 
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one another via law firms, relative to randomly-selected non-backdating companies. In 
addition, the networks of backdating companies have higher mean clustering coefficients 
(CC) and lower mean shortest paths (SP) in each of the years. The mean shortest paths of the 
networks of randomly-selected companies are close to the number of companies in the 
networks, consistent with a very low degree of connectivity between the companies. 
[Please insert Figure 6 about here] 
Overall the results presented from our law firm network analysis are consistent with P1 
and suggest that companies that backdate appear to be unusually clustered to one another.   
6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Our next set of tests use regression analysis to further examine whether using a law firm 
that has a backdating client increases the probability that a company will backdate.  We 
examine P2 by estimating the following logistic model: 
 logit 6"789":$(;)* = 	> + 	@	A"BC$'DA$(8)* + E	!&(:'&#F)* + G)* (1) 
where 6"789":$(;)* is a dummy variable equal to one if company i backdated in fiscal year t 
and zero otherwise; A"BC$'DA$(8)*  is a dummy variable equal to one if company i is 
represented by a law firm during t that had represented another company j during the period 
when company j was backdating and zero otherwise, and !&(:'&#F)* is a vector of control 
variables. We estimate the logistic model for company-years in which options were granted 
and data is available (see Table 1), and use several variations of  A"BC$'DA$(8)* as follows: 
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A"BC$'DA$(8)* : one if company i is represented by a law firm at t that also 
represented another company j during t or earlier in a year that it backdated, and zero 
otherwise;  
A"BC$'DA$(8)** : one if company i is represented by a law firm at t that also 
represented another company j during t in a year that it backdated, and zero otherwise; 
and 
A"BC$'DA$(8)**-. : one if company i is represented by a law firm at t that also 
represented another company j during t-1 in a year that it backdated, and zero 
otherwise. 22 
Exhibit 2 provides example timelines that further explain the LawFirmLink variables. 
Each panel depicts three fiscal years for companies i and j. Company j is a backdating 
company and company i is linked to company j via law firm Abc LLP in various fiscal years 
discussed in detail below.  
• In Panel A, company i’s law firm (Abc LLP), represented company j throughout all three 
years. Here company j only backdated in fiscal year t-2, so we have: A"BC$'DA$(8 = 1, A"BC$'DA$(8* = 0, and A"BC$'DA$(8*-. = 0.   
• In Panel B, company i’s law firm (Abc LLP), represented company j only in its most 
recent fiscal year t, during which company j also backdated. Because the link period 
                                                
22 When constructing the LawFirmLink variables, we assume that a law firm represents j (the “from” company) 
every year between the first and last year the law firm was associated with j while it was a backdater. This is an 
important precaution that reduces errors due to sample attrition and data incompleteness. For example, if j 
backdated and was represented by a law firm between 2002 and 2004, but 2003 data is missing due to sample 
attrition or law firm data unavailability, other companies that had the same law firm as j at 2003 may have the 
variable A"BC$'DA$(8)**  (but not A"BC$'DA$(8)* or A"BC$'DA$(8)**-.) erroneously coded as zero. 
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overlaps with t but not t−1, A"BC$'DA$(8 = 1 , A"BC$'DA$(8* = 1 , and A"BC$'DA$(8*-. = 0.  
• In Panel C, company i’s law firm (Abc LLP), represented company j only in fiscal year t-
1, during which company j also backdated. Due to the firms having different fiscal year 
ends, the link period overlaps with both t and t−1, so A"BC$'DA$(8 =	A"BC$'DA$(8* = A"BC$'DA$(8*-. = 1.   
[Please insert Exhibit 2 about here] 
We include controls in the regression model based on prior literature on the determinants 
of options backdating. Collins et al. (2009) include controls for company size, high-
technology companies, and auditor type, and Veld and Wu (2014) include a variable for 
dispensable cash, defined as cash minus interest expenses scaled by total assets, because an 
“alternative for option backdating is to pay cash while leaving the existing options intact” (p. 
1051). Both Collins et al. (2009) and Veld and Wu (2014) included controls for stock 
volatility, since the potential gain from stock option backdating increases with the variation in 
stock prices. 23   We construct the control variables as follows:  J$KL),*-.  is the natural 
logarithm of beginning market value (Compustat: csho × prcc_f); N$;ℎPL7ℎ)* equals 1 if the 
company’s SIC code is between 7370 and 7379 inclusive; QR9$:&')*  equals 1 if the 
company’s auditor is one of the Big 5 audit companies (Compustat: au between 1 and 8); S$FT!"Fℎ),*-.  is cash and cash equivalents less interest expenses scaled by total assets 
(Compustat: (che − xint) / at), at the beginning of the year; and U'$7LV&#)* is the standard 
deviation of daily stock price during the fiscal year. We include a dummy variable 
                                                
23 Collins et al. (2009) use the standard deviation of returns over 60 months while Veld and Wu (2014), whose 
level of analysis is the individual option grant, use the standard deviation of daily stock prices in the month of the 
option grant. We use daily returns over the entire fiscal year because our level of analysis is the company-year. 
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!"#$%&'($")*, equal to 1 if the company’s state (Compustat: state) is California, due to the 
large proportion of backdating companies located in California. We also include year fixed 
effects to take into account changes in the frequency of backdating across the sample period. 
The network analysis in Tables 3A and 3B indicate that backdating companies have more 
incoming law firm connections, suggesting that they have larger law firms. In addition, Panel 
A of Table 2 suggests that larger law firms have a greater proportion of backdating clients.  
This suggests that LawFirmLink and law firm size are correlated. We define the size of a 
company’s law firm each year (A"BC$'DJ$KL*) as the natural logarithm of the number of 
unique companies the law firm represented between 1996 and the end of each year. 24 We 
replicate our estimation of Equation 1 using law firm size as the independent variable, and 
also estimate Equation 1 within subsamples partitioned by law firm size. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for key variables used in our analyses. The 
Backdating variable has a mean of 0.034, indicating that backdating occurs in 3.4% of 
company-years. The LawFirmLink variables indicate that between 28.5% and 35.2% of all 
observations are linked to a backdating company via a law firm depending on the definition of 
the link.25  The median log law firm size is 2.77, corresponding to the median company-year 
being associated with a law firm that has 16.0 clients. Approximately 89.2% of observations 
are audited by one of the Big 5 audit companies, 13.6% of observations are high-technology 
                                                
24 If a company has more than one law firm during t, we sum of the numbers of unique clients across law firms. 
25 Note that the LawFirmLink variables reflect the proportion of sample companies that are linked directly to a 
backdating company at a given time.  In contrast, in our network analyses the size of the largest connected 
component (e.g. 63.9% in 2002 in Table 3B) refers to the largest proportion of sample companies that are linked 
to each other either directly or indirectly via other companies. 
 28 
companies and 22.2% are headquartered in California. The median company size is 5.79, 
corresponding to a market value of about $327 million, and on average, companies have 
dispensable cash of 22.8% of total assets. The average price volatility over the fiscal year is 
3.59, and the lower median of 2.27 suggests that the price volatility is positively skewed. 
Panel B of Table 5 provides Pearson and Spearman correlations.  6"789":$(;)*  is 
significantly positively correlated with the LawFirmLink variables as expected, with Pearson 
correlations between 11 percent and 12 percent (t-statistics between 12.98 and 14.73), 
depending on the link definition. 6"789":$(;)* is also significantly positively correlated with 
law firm size, company size and whether the company is headquartered in California, with 
respective Pearson correlations of 11 percent (t = 13.20), 11 percent (t = 13.20) and 13 percent 
(t = 15.73). It is also weakly positively correlated with the company having a Big 5 auditor, 
with a Pearson correlation of 4 percent (t = 4.64).  As expected, the three LawFirmLink 
variables are highly correlated with each other, with correlations of at least 85 percent. In 
addition, the LawFirmLink variables are highly correlated with law firm size, with Pearson 
correlations between 61 percent and 64 percent. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
Panel A of Table 6 provides a comparison of backdating companies (Backdating = 1) to 
non-backdating companies (Backdating = 0).  Consistent with the correlations, the tests of 
difference in means indicate that backdating companies are significantly larger, more likely to 
be in high-technology industries, more likely to have a Big N auditor, have more disposable 
cash, have greater stock price volatility, and are more likely to be located in California.   All 
differences are significant at the one percent level.  In columns 6 to 9 we propensity match the 
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samples each year based on the control variables.  We use a full matching procedure 
(Rosenbaum, 1991) that assigns weights to observations, and we drop observations that are 
outside the support of the propensity score.26  After propensity score matching the differences 
for all control variables become statistically insignificant. 
Panel A of Table 6 also reports the three variations of LawFirmLink before and after 
matching on the control variables (we do not match on LawFirmLink).  The average 
backdating company has a 63 percent chance of being linked to another backdating company 
(LawFirmLink = 0.63).  In contrast, around 34 percent of non-backdating firms are linked to a 
backdating company via their law firms (LawFirmLink = 0.34).  This suggests that a company 
is almost twice as likely to be linked via a law firm to another backdating company if it is a 
backdater. Columns 6 to 9 provides comparisons after matching on the control variables. The 
differences in LawFirmLink remain statistically significant, consistent with law firm links 
being important for explaining backdating after controlling for other company characteristics.  
We explore this in more detail in Table 7.  
Panel B of Table 6 takes a different perspective.  Here we compare companies that are 
linked to a backdating company via their law firm (LawFirmLink = 1) to those that are not 
linked via a law firm (LawFirmLink = 0). Note that approximately 63 percent of backdaters 
and 34 percent of non-backdaters have LawFirmLink = 1.  Thus, in this comparison, these 
companies are pooled together and we analyze the characteristics of both backdating and non-
backdating companies that are linked to a backdaters via their law firms.  The differences in 
                                                
26 Following our matching procedure for the network simulations (Table 4), when matching backdating and non-
backdating observations, we do not drop backdating observations. Nevertheless, when we drop both backdating 
and non-backdating observations that are outside the support of the propensity score, our sample remains almost 
identical (decreasing by only three company-years), and our inferences are unchanged. 
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means for the control variables are all highly significant and in the same direction as in 
Columns 2 to 5 of Panel A, suggesting that companies that share a law firm with a backdater 
are different from companies that do not, but that they have similar characteristics to 
backdaters. For companies that share a law firm with a backdating company, the probability 
of being a backdater is 6.07 percent.  In contrast, the probability of being a backdater for 
companies that do not share a law firm with a backdating company is 1.93 percent.  After 
propensity score matching on control variables, the difference in likelihood of being a 
backdating company (i.e., Backdating =1) remains significant.  
 [Please insert Table 6 about here] 
6.2 Regression Analysis of Law Firm Links 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating Equation 1 for the three variations of the 
LawFirmLink variable. Regressions (1) to (4) present the results without matching, and 
regressions (5) to (7) present the results after matching backdating and non-backdating 
observations each year as described in Panel A of Table 6.  In all regressions, the 
LawFirmLink variables are significantly positively related to the odds of backdating.  At the 
bottom of Table 6 we convert the coefficients to odds ratios by computing the exponentials of 
the corresponding coefficients.  For regression (1) with no control variables, the odds ratio is 
3.287, suggesting that with no controls, the odds of backdating is about three times as high 
when a company is linked to another backdating company via its law firm, than when a 
company is not.27  For the regressions (2) to (4) with control variables included, the odds 
                                                
27 The odds ratio from regression (1) can also be directly compared to the proportions reported in Panel B of 
Table 6.  The probability of being a backdating company given that the company is linked by its law firm to 
another backdating company is 6.072 percent (Table 6 Panel B).  This means that the probability of a linked 
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ratios range between 1.568 to 1.88, and after matching in regressions (5) to (7) the odds ratios 
range from 1.531 to 1.876.  This suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics, the 
odds of backdating are between 53.1 percent and 88.1 percent higher if a company is linked to 
a backdating company via a law firm than if it is not, ceteris paribus.28  In remaining tables 
we provide results using propensity score matching based on backdating firm characteristics. 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 Panel A examines the sensitivity of our findings to law firm size. Regression (1) 
shows that companies with larger law firms are significantly more likely to backdate, but 
regression (2) shows that the impact of law firm size is subsumed by LawFirmLinkt. In 
regression (3), we omit company-years that were linked to the law firm with the greatest 
number of backdating clients. We provide this regression to ensure that the results are 
generalizable and not due to one law firm.  The coefficient on LawFirmLinkt is 0.296 is 
statistically significant and of a similar magnitude to 0.349 reported for the full model in 
regression (2).  Regressions (4) and (5) partition the sample by median LawFirmSizet each 
year. The coefficients on LawFirmLink are statistically significant in both regressions, 
suggesting that being linked to a backdating company via a law firm connection, whether the 
law firm is small or large, increases the probability of backdating. In Panel B of Table 8, we 
                                                                                                                                                   
company not backdating is (1 - 0.06072) or 93.928% and so the odds of backdating when LawFirmLink equals 
one is equal to 0.06072 / 0.93928 = 0.06465.  In contrast, the odds of backdating when LawFirmLink equals zero 
is 0.01929 / (1 - 0.01929) = 0.01967.  The odds ratio reported in Table 7 is calculated as 0.06465 / 0.01967 = 
3.287 (i.e., the odds of backdating is about three times as high when a company is linked to another backdating 
company via its law firm than when a company is not linked to a backdating company).  To put this odds ratio in 
context, note that the unconditional probability of being a backdating company in the population is small – just 
3.4% but being linked via a law firm to a backdating company almost doubles this probability to 6.07%. 
28 The pseudo R-squares are lower in the regressions with matching because after matching backdating and non-
backdating companies on the control variables, the control variables no longer contribute explanatory power to 
the model. 
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replicate our main regressions using variations of our LawFirmLink variables. LFLinkDiffInd 
is defined in the same way as LawFirmLink, except that they take the value of one only if the 
focal company is linked via a law firm to a backdating company with a different two-digit SIC 
code. All variations of LFLinkDiffInd are positively related to backdating, suggesting that our 
findings are not driven by spreading of backdating along shared industries. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
6.3 The Influence of Peers:  Director Links and Geographical Links 
We next investigate two possible ways that a company could learn about peer backdating 
activities beyond learning it from their legal counsel.  The first is via a director who sits on a 
backdating company’s board and the second is by communicating with other executives that 
live in the same city. 
To examine the effect of board interlocks we augment Equation 1 as follows: 
 logit 6"789":$(;)* = 	> + 	@.A"BC$'DCA$(8)* + @0S$'A$(8)* + E	!&(:'&#F)* + G)* (2) 
Where S$'A$(8)* is equal to one if at least one of company i’s directors at t was on the board 
of company j during t or earlier in a year that it backdated, and zero otherwise. 
Table 9 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the sample with director information 
before and after matching on backdating company characteristics. Panel A indicates that 20 
percent of backdating companies are linked to another backdating company via a director.  In 
contrast, 12 percent of non-backdating companies are linked to backdating companies via 
board interlocks.  This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.04%).  However, after 
matching on control variables, DirLink is no longer significant (p = 66.7%). Panel B of Table 
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9 provides our logistic regressions with propensity score matching between backdating and 
non-backdating companies. Regression (1) suggests that director links are not associated with 
backdating after matching. Regressions (2) to (4) show that law firm links remain statistically 
and economically significant in explaining backdating when director links are included in the 
models. In regression (2), for example, LawFirmLinkt is associated with an odds ratio of 1.365 
while DirLinkt is associated with an odds ratio of 1.110, and only LawFirmLinkt is statistically 
significant at conventional significance levels.  
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
The results in Table 9 contrast with Bizjak et al. (2009) who find that board interlocks are 
significant even when they include various controls.  Bizjak et al. develop an ex ante measure 
of the likelihood of backdating based on the grant dates occurring when the stock price is at a 
local low.  In contrast, we have an ex post measure of backdating based on restatements.  The 
advantage of their approach is a larger sample size. The disadvantage is the possibility that 
some of the companies did not backdate but were either lucky or timed news releases.  In 
contrast, our sample has a high degree of certainty that backdating occurred, but we sacrifice 
power.  That is, some of the control firms could have had directors who spread the backdating 
but the firm did not restate earnings and so we did not identify these firms.   
Another way that a company could learn about backdating is from interactions with other 
executives at peer companies that backdate.  We do not have a direct measure of executive 
interaction but we expect that executives located in the same city are more likely to interact 
with each other than executives located further apart.   We estimate the following regression: 
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 logit 6"789":$(;)* = 	> + 	@.A"BC$'DA$(8)* + @0WL&A$(8)* + E	!&(:'&#F)* + G)* (3) 
where WL&A$(8)* is equal to one if the city in which company i is headquartered at t is the 
headquarters of company j during t or earlier in a year that it backdated, and zero otherwise.   
We report descriptive statistics before and after matching and the regression results in 
Table 10. Panel A shows that before matching, backdating companies are about twice as 
likely as non-backdating companies to be linked to a backdating company via geographic 
links. After matching, the GeoLink and LawFirmLink variables remains significant. Panel B 
provides the results from estimating Equation 3.  Regression (1) indicates that a company has 
about 1.5 times the odds of backdating when it is in a city that headquartered another 
backdating company. Regressions (2) to (4) show that when both law firm links and 
geographic links are included in the models, both are statistically significant in explaining 
backdating.29  Regression (5) adds director links to regression (4), but as with our findings in 
Table 9, director links are not significant, whereas the GeoLink and LawFirmLink variables 
remain significant.   
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
6.4 Do Companies Switch to Law Firms that Allow Backdating? 
                                                
29 We perform several untabulated robustness checks. First, we add a new dummy variable for companies in 
Massachusetts in addition to the California dummy, because Massachusetts also has a disproportionate share of 
backdating companies. Second, we use state fixed effects instead of the California dummy after restricting the 
data to states with backdating observations. Third, we use industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects instead of the 
HighTech dummy after restricting the data to industries with backdating observations.  In all checks, our 
inferences are unchanged. 
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It is possible that rather than law firms influencing companies, the direction of causality 
runs in the opposite direction:  an executive could learn about backdating from another 
executive at a backdating company and then hire that company's law firm to advise on the 
practice.  To determine the importance of this explanation we examine law firm switches.  If a 
company is more likely to backdate in a year in which it hires a new law firm, and if 
backdating is more highly associated with law firm links when a company has a new law firm, 
this would suggest that companies hire law firms to facilitate backdating.   
We define a variable AC!ℎ"(;L)* as equal to one if at least one of company i’s law firms 
at t did not represent i in a prior year, and we restrict the sample to company-years where data 
on the company’s law firms in a prior year is available. In other words, AC!ℎ"(;L)* indicates 
the presence of a new law firm at year t. About 13.4% of company-years in this sample had 
LFChangeit equal to one. If the selection of new law firms is positively related to backdating, AC!ℎ"(;L)* will be positively related to 6"789":$(;)*. If selecting a new law firm results in 
links to backdating companies being more likely to give rise to option backdating in the focal 
company, the interaction between the LawFirmLink variables and AC!ℎ"(;L)*  will be 
positively associated with 6"789":$(;)* . We provide the results in Table 11. When both 
LFChange and LawFirmLink × LFChange are included in Equation 1, we find that LFChange 
and LawFirmLink × LFChange are statistically insignificant and that LawFirmLink remains 
significant.  These results suggest that our findings are not explained by companies selecting 
new law firms. 
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
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6.5 Do Law Firms with Backdating Clients have Other “Lucky” Grant Clients?  
We contend that executives were willing to engage in backdating because they learned of 
the practice from their law firm.  Our empirical analysis identifies backdating companies via 
restatements.  However, it is possible that other companies engaged in backdating but did not 
restate their earnings.  Prior literature suggests that grant date “luck” is likely to be correlated 
with backdating (e.g., Bebchuk et al. 2010).   Our next test examines whether law firms with 
more backdating clients were also more likely to have other clients that had “lucky” grants.  In 
other words, if a law firm spread the practice of backdating among its clients, but only some 
of its clients restated, then we should observe that other clients were more likely to have 
“lucky” grants.   
We define a company-year as lucky when a CEO grant date during the year had one of the 
two lowest closing prices during the period beginning (ending) ten trading days before (after) 
the grant date. Therefore, a single CEO grant has a 2/21 or 9.5 percent probability of being 
lucky by random chance.  We find that companies grant options on average 1.27 times per 
year.  A company-year in our sample has about a 12.1 percent probability of being lucky by 
random chance, assuming grant dates are random and independent of each other.30 
Panel A of Table 12 provides a contingency table that displays whether a company-year is 
restated for backdating and whether the grant date is “lucky.”  The results indicate that 34 
percent of backdating company-years are lucky versus 17.1 percent for other company-years 
                                                
30 Note that 12.1% is an approximation because luck may not be independent: if a grant is backdated in a given 
company-year, then other grants for that company-year are more likely to be backdated.  In addition, the 
proportion of “lucky” grants could be higher than 12.1% even in the absence of backdating when companies time 
news releases (e.g., Aboody and Kasznick 2000). 
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Thus, a backdating restatement year is twice as likely to have a “lucky” grant than a regular 
company-year observation.  
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
We next examine the role of law firms.  Panel B focuses on companies that did not have 
backdating restatements.  We then analyze the probability of a “lucky” grant in law firms that 
had backdating clients compared to law firms that did not have backdating clients.  The results 
indicate that companies are more likely to be “lucky” when their external counsel has another 
client that backdated (17.8 percent versus 16.3 percent).  Note that this test excludes 
company-years that are identified as backdating via restatements. 
Panel C performs the same analysis as Panel B but we define a law firm as having 
backdating clients when more than four percent of the clients backdated. This four percent 
threshold is based on the overall proportion of backdating clients identified in large law firms 
(those with more than 40 client companies) in Panel A of Figure 3.  This test is more powerful 
since it is less likely that the backdating company is matched to the law firm by chance.  The 
probability of being “lucky” increases from 17.8 percent to 18.8 percent in law firms with 
backdating clients.  Panel D focuses on larger law firms.  The probability of having a “lucky” 
grant increases to 19.9 percent for law firms with a greater preponderance of backdating 
clients and declines to 15.3 percent in law firms that are less likely to have been aware of, or 
spread backdating.  
In summary, Table 12 indicates that law firms with more backdating clients appear to have 
other client companies that are more likely to be “lucky.” If a “lucky” grant reflects a 
backdated grant, then this is consistent with even greater clustering of backdating among 
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clients of certain law firms than reflected in our preceding tests.  The results in Table 12 
therefore provide additional support for our predictions. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we ask the question: How do accounting practices spread and in particular 
how do suboptimal accounting practices spread?  Better understanding the answer to this 
question is important because poor accounting practices can distort economic reality as 
reflected in the financial statements.  This, in turn, reduces the usefulness and reliability of 
accounting information for monitoring management and the efficient allocation of resources 
in capital markets.  
For a suboptimal accounting rule to spread there must be a demand by executives for the 
distortion because they see a benefit either to themselves or for their company.  However, 
even though self-interest is important for explaining decision making, other factors also 
influence judgment.  We suggest that a suboptimal accounting practice is more likely to 
spread when executives learn about the practice from an “expert” who can both explain the 
practice and confirm that the practice has worked for other companies.  The combination of 
both an “expert” and “the power of the crowd” endorsing the practice can desensitize the 
executive to the inappropriateness of the practice and sway them to the self-interested 
suboptimal choice. 
We use the stock option backdating scandal to investigate this question.  We hypothesize 
that law firms spread the practice by alerting their clients to this choice and informing their 
clients that other companies had engaged in the practice.  We provide evidence consistent 
with this explanation.  We show that backdating companies are highly connected to each other 
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through the law firms that they used. Our regression analysis indicates that the odds of 
backdating are between 1.53 and 1.88 times as high when a company’s law firm represents or 
represented another client in a year that it backdated.  
Our research has implications for future research.  Can we learn more about the spread of 
other suboptimal accounting practices through the use of network analysis?  Can we identify 
other parties such as investment bankers, consultants, and tax advisors spreading suboptimal 
accounting practices?  Is there a way to stop poor accounting practices before regulators such 
as the FASB or SEC need to intervene either to change the rules or prosecute parties 
involved?  The spread of poor accounting practices is costly because it reduces the credibility 
and reputation of the accounting profession.  We do not want poor accounting practices to 
turn into profit opportunities for lawyers, investment bankers, and consultants.     
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Calculation of clustering coefficients and shortest path in a network 
 
Node Linked nodes 
Possible links between 
nodes in any direction Link Exists 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
A B, C B ↔ C Yes 1 
B A, C A ↔ C Yes 1 
C A, B, D A ↔ B Yes  
0.333   A ↔ D No 
  B ↔ D No 
D C None N/A 0 
Sum of clustering coefficients (4 nodes) 2.333 






The clustering coefficient of a given node is the proportion of the potential undirected links between 
the nodes it is linked from or to that exist.  Isolated nodes and nodes that are linked from or to only 
one node are assigned clustering coefficients of zero. The mean clustering coefficient is the mean 
clustering coefficient over all nodes. The shortest path between two nodes is the minimum number of 
links needed to reach one node from another, taking the direction of the links into account.  The 
shortest path between nodes that are not linked by any directed path is defined as the maximum 
possible path length in the network plus one.  The mean shortest path of the network is the sum of all 
shortest paths divided by the total possible number of directed paths.  
 
  
Node  Shortest path Length of shortest path 
A  to B: (none) 4 
 to C: A → C 1 
  to D: A → C → D 2 
B  to A: B → A 1 
 to C: B → C 1 
 to D: B → C → D 2 
C  to A: (none) 4 
 to B: (none) 4 
  to D: C → D 1 
D  to A: (none) 4 
 to B: (none) 4 
  to C: D → C 1 
Sum of shortest paths (12 paths) 29 
Mean shortest path (29 / 12) 2.417 
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Exhibit 2 
Examples depicting the construction of the law firm link variables 
 
Panels A, B, and C present example timelines explaining the construction of the LawFirmLink 
variables. Each panel depicts three fiscal years for companies i and j. In company i’s third fiscal year, 
it was represented by the law firm Abc LLP, which also represented company j. Assuming that the law 
firms did not represent any other backdating company, the value of the LawFirmLink variables for 






Sample selection for company-level tests 
 
Sample selection  









          
Panel A: Main analyses     
Compustat company-years, 1997 to 2006  116,643 19,450   
Require availability of PERMNO and CIK 71,117 12,397   
At-the-money option grants during the year 34,715 7,717 824 141 
Restricted to unscheduled CEO grants 18,591 6,142 504 128 
Require daily stock prices around the grant date 18,505 6,105 504 128 
Observations with law firm data available 15,236 5,159 475 123 
Availability of variables for the regressions 13,912 4,762 471 123 
After applying propensity score matching 10,312 3,712 471 123 
     
Panel B: Reconciliation to Audit Analytics     
Companies with Backdating code (48)       171 
Companies with Compustat coverage       158 
Companies with CRSP coverage       152 
Companies with Thomson Reuters coverage       146 
Companies with at-the-money option grants       141 
     
Panel C: Director links     
Availability of variables for the regressions 13,912 4,762 471 123 
Availability of director data from ISS 4,671 1,520 215 65 
After applying propensity score matching 3,776 1,381 215 65 
     
Panel D: Geographic links     
Availability of variables for the regressions 13,912 4,762 471 123 
Availability of city and state data 13,707 4,671 462 119 
After applying propensity score matching 10,186 3,654 462 119 







The distribution of client companies involved in backdating for law and audit firms 
 
Panel A: Law firms (LF) and client backdating 













% of LF with 
clients that 
backdated 













(6 / 5) for 
each LF bin 
(0, 5]  812 21 2.6% 1,355 21 1.5% 
 (5, 10]  113 17 15.0% 797 19 2.4% 
 (10, 20]  85 16 18.8% 1,161 21 1.8% 
 (20, 40]  47 22 46.8% 1,292 33 2.6% 
 (40, Max]  23 20 87.0% 1,617 70 4.3% 
Any 1080 96 8.9% 5,159 123 2.4% 
 
Panel B: Audit firms and client backdating 
Audit Firm 
No. of  No. of clients  % of clients  
clients  that backdated  that backdated  
1 Ernst & Young 1,314 37 2.8% 
2 PwC 1,198 36 3.0% 
3 KPMG 905 23 2.5% 
4 Deloitte & Touche 820 27 3.3% 
5 Arthur Andersen 722 10 1.4% 
6 Grant Thornton 209 4 1.9% 
7 BDO Seidman 164 6 3.7% 
8 McGladrey and Pullen 41 1 2.4% 
9 Other 512 4 0.8% 
Any 4,848 123 2.5% 
Panels A and B show descriptive statistics of companies by the type of law firm or audit firm. In Panel A we 
partition law firms by the number of unique companies each law firm represented over our sample period. In 
Panel B we group audit firms by the eight audit firms with more than 40 clients in the sample, and other audit 
firms. We use the sample of 15,236 company-years with law firm data available, and further require auditor data 
from Compustat (Compustat: au) for Panel B. In the rightmost three columns of both panels we show the number 
of clients within the law firms or audit firms bin, and the number and proportion of those clients that backdated 
during the sample period. The numbers in each bin may not sum to the total numbers of clients because a 
company may be linked to multiple law and audit firms. The number of individual audit firms in the "Other" 





Characteristics of the law firm networks each year, 1997 to 2001 
 
Fiscal year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Panel A: Basic descriptives           
No. of companies 1,202 1,467 1,526 1,587 1,706 
No. of links 10,607 17,323 19,320 22,926 33,108 
No. of unique law firms 451 483 494 522 502 
Mean law firms per link 1.000 1.004 1.002 1.003 1.002 
Panel B: Subsets of the network           
Size of largest component (#) 218 507 714 914 1,130 
Size of largest component (%) 18.1% 34.6% 46.8% 57.6% 66.2% 
Size of next-largest component (#) 27 48 24 14 22 
Size of next-largest component (%) 2.2% 3.3% 1.6% 0.9% 1.3% 
Unconnected companies (#) 218 200 193 204 187 
Unconnected companies (%) 18.1% 13.6% 12.6% 12.9% 11.0% 
Panel C: Distribution of in-degree           
  Non-backdating companies      
No. of companies 1,188 1,447 1,493 1,556 1,653 
Mean in-degree 8.7 11.6 12.4 14.1 18.8 
Median in-degree 3 5 6 6 7 
Std. dev. of in-degree  14.8 18.9 17.8 22.3 29.7 
  Backdating companies      
No. of companies 14 20 33 31 53 
Mean in-degree 17.9 27.3 25.8 33.4 37.6 
Median in-degree 9 11 13 19 17 
Std. dev. of in-degree  21.5 30.2 27.4 35.6 43.7 
  Backdating companies - non-backdating companies    
Difference in mean in-degree 9.2 15.7 13.5 19.3 18.8 
t-statistic 1.600 2.321 2.812 3.008 3.109 
Table 3A (Table 3B) provides descriptive statistics of the law firm networks each year from 
1997 to 2001 (2002 to 2006) inclusive. Each year t we construct networks in which nodes 
represent companies in the sample at t, and a link from company j to company i exists at t if 
at least one of i’s law firms at t also represented j between 1996 and the end of t. A node i is 
labeled as backdating at t if 6"789":$(;)* = 1. A component of a network comprises a set 
of nodes that are connected to each other via one or more links, ignoring the direction of the 






Characteristics of the law firm networks each year, 2002 to 2006 
 
Fiscal year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A: Basic descriptives           
No. of companies 1,603 1,629 1,660 1,570 1,286 
No. of links 29,051 30,576 31,655 28,545 19,497 
No. of unique law firms 473 490 486 459 418 
Mean law firms per link 1.002 1.001 1.002 1.004 1.005 
Panel B: Subsets of the network           
Size of largest component (#) 1,025 1,169 1,264 1,246 976 
Size of largest component (%) 63.9% 71.8% 76.1% 79.4% 75.9% 
Size of next-largest component (#) 44 14 35 8 10 
Size of next-largest component (%) 2.7% 0.9% 2.1% 0.5% 0.8% 
Unconnected companies (#) 161 177 161 137 135 
Unconnected companies (%) 10.0% 10.9% 9.7% 8.7% 10.5% 
Panel C: Distribution of in-degree           
  Non-backdating companies      
No. of companies 1,540 1,551 1,585 1,500 1,248 
Mean in-degree 17.6 17.9 18.1 17.4 14.6 
Median in-degree 7 7 8 7 6 
Std. dev. of in-degree  26.7 28.4 28.4 26.8 19.6 
  Backdating companies      
No. of companies 63 78 75 70 38 
Mean in-degree 31.9 35.7 38.8 33.9 32.8 
Median in-degree 18 17 20 20 19.5 
Std. dev. of in-degree  36.4 42.5 47.0 40.1 29.8 
  Backdating companies - non-backdating companies    
Difference in mean in-degree 14.4 17.7 20.7 16.5 18.1 
t-statistic 3.099 3.644 3.780 3.394 3.727 







Clustering in networks of backdating and randomly-selected companies 
 
Panel A: Clustering coefficient (CC)               
 Backdating Distribution of mean CC from 10,000 simulations each year 
Year No. Mean CC Mean StdD Min P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 Max 
1997 14 0.167 0.008 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.429 
1998 19 0.368 0.015 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.184 0.421 
1999 31 0.231 0.043 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.129 0.172 0.226 0.387 
2000 31 0.323 0.092 0.085 0.000 0.097 0.129 0.204 0.237 0.323 0.452 
2001 52 0.389 0.173 0.074 0.000 0.173 0.221 0.269 0.297 0.355 0.522 
2002 63 0.444 0.205 0.067 0.000 0.203 0.249 0.291 0.316 0.368 0.473 
2003 78 0.468 0.231 0.063 0.032 0.231 0.274 0.313 0.335 0.379 0.465 
2004 75 0.455 0.225 0.063 0.031 0.224 0.267 0.305 0.331 0.377 0.490 
2005 70 0.534 0.205 0.064 0.000 0.202 0.246 0.289 0.313 0.360 0.479 
2006 38 0.344 0.131 0.083 0.000 0.132 0.184 0.242 0.272 0.337 0.465 
Panel B: Shortest Path (SP)         
 Backdating Distribution of mean SP from 10,000 simulations each year 
Year No. Mean SP Mean StdD Min P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 Max 
1997 14 13.082 13.910 0.126 13.000 13.429 13.714 13.714 13.857 14.000 14.000 
1998 19 18.056 18.870 0.134 17.737 18.368 18.579 18.684 18.789 18.895 19.000 
1999 31 29.784 30.736 0.170 29.516 30.226 30.419 30.488 30.677 30.743 31.000 
2000 31 29.453 30.575 0.276 28.571 29.601 30.034 30.226 30.452 30.616 31.000 
2001 52 47.429 51.030 0.547 45.820 49.113 49.995 50.368 50.811 51.155 51.923 
2002 63 59.743 61.725 0.636 54.592 59.618 60.528 60.913 61.435 61.861 62.873 
2003 78 73.565 76.535 0.647 71.343 74.378 75.318 75.704 76.236 76.669 77.692 
2004 75 65.780 73.115 0.952 66.276 69.870 71.270 71.885 72.679 73.328 74.680 
2005 70 64.092 68.423 0.797 61.828 65.801 66.856 67.385 68.065 68.603 69.714 
2006 38 35.353 37.330 0.397 32.685 35.882 36.590 36.847 37.163 37.422 37.974 
This table shows the mean clustering coefficient and mean shortest path for the law firm networks of backdating 
companies each year (in grey on the left), and the distributions of the mean clustering coefficient and mean shortest 
path from 10,000 simulations of same-sized networks of companies selected randomly each year (on the right). Non-
backdating companies with market capitalization beyond the first and third quartile of the market capitalization of 
backdating companies at the start of each year are omitted before the random selection. Each year t, a law firm 
network is defined as follows: companies in the network comprise companies in the sample at t, and a law firm link 
from company j to company i exists at t if at least one of i’s law firms at t also represented j between 1996 and the 






Summary statistics of key variables used in regression analysis  
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N = 13,912) 
   Mean   StdD   P1   P25   P50   P75   P99  6"789":$(;* 0.034 0.181 0 0 0 0 1 A"BC$'DA$(8* 0.352 0.477 0 0 0 1 1 A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.310 0.462 0 0 0 1 1 A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.285 0.451 0 0 0 1 1 A"BC$'DJ$KL* 2.732 1.407 0.000 1.792 2.773 3.689 5.638 J$KL*-. 5.803 1.818 1.939 4.506 5.787 6.988 10.224 N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.136 0.343 0 0 0 0 1 QR9$:&'* 0.892 0.310 0 1 1 1 1 S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.228 0.266 -0.053 0.012 0.122 0.392 0.916 U'$7LV&#* 3.592 4.331 0.206 1.182 2.269 4.347 21.336 !"#$%&'($"* 0.222 0.416 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations above and Spearman correlations below the diagonal 
     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10 11 
1  6"789":$(;* 1 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.13 
2  A"BC$'DA$(8* 0.11 1 0.91 0.86 0.64 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.32 
3  A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.12 0.91 1 0.85 0.62 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.33 
4  A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.12 0.86 0.85 1 0.61 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.31 
5  A"BC$'DJ$KL* 0.11 0.66 0.63 0.62 1 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.09 0.35 
6  J$KL*-. 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.18 1 -0.05 0.31 -0.10 0.41 0.02 
7  N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 -0.05 1 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.10 
8  QR9$:&'* 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.31 0.00 1 0.03 0.15 0.03 
9  S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.09 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.29 -0.08 0.28 0.02 1 0.08 0.31 
10  U'$7LV&#* 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.58 0.01 0.25 0.03 1 0.06 
11 !"#$%&'($"* 0.13 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.31 0.02 1 
Panel A shows the mean, standard deviation, and selected quantiles for key variables used in the main regression 
analyses. The variables are defined as follows: 6"789":$(;)* equals 1 if the company-year {$, :} overlaps with 
i’s backdating period if it backdated, and 0 otherwise; A"BC$'DA$(8)*, A"BC$'DA$(8)** , and A"BC$'DA$(8)**-. 
respectively equal 1 if company i is linked via a law firm at t to another company’s backdating during t or earlier, 
during t, or during t-1, and 0 otherwise; A"BC$'DJ$KL)*  is the natural logarithm of the number of unique 
companies the law firm represented between 1996 and t, and if the company had more than one law firm in t, the 
sum of their numbers of unique companies is used; J$KL),*-. is the natural logarithm of beginning market value 
(Compustat: csho × prcc_f); N$;ℎPL7ℎ)*  equals 1 if the company’s SIC code is between 7370 and 7379 
inclusive; QR9$:&')* equals 1 if the company’s auditor is one of the Big 5 audit firms (Compustat: au between 1 
and 8); S$FT!"Fℎ),*-. is cash and cash equivalents less interest expenses scaled by total assets (Compustat: (che 
− xint) / at), at the beginning of the year; U'$7LV&#)* is the standard deviation of daily stock price during the 
fiscal year, and !"#$%&'($")*  equals 1 if the company was headquartered in California at t. All non-dummy 




Descriptive statistics before and after matching on backdating firm characteristics or 
law firm link characteristics 
Panel A: Comparison of backdating to non-backdating companies  
          
 
Difference in Means  
 
After Propensity Score Matching 
 
(N = 13,912) 
 
on Backdating  (N = 10,312) 6"789":$(;* 0 1 Diff. t-stat.   0 1 Diff. t-stat. 
Matched Control Variables  J$KL*-. 5.77 6.88 1.12 12.63 
 
6.95 6.88 -0.07 -1.19 N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.13 0.26 0.12 7.75 
 
0.22 0.26 0.04 1.53 QR9$:&'* 0.89 0.96 0.07 5.47 
 
0.96 0.96 -0.01 -1.29 S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.22 0.33 0.11 8.35 
 
0.31 0.33 0.02 0.84 U'$7LV&#* 3.53 5.40 1.87 10.98 
 
5.93 5.40 -0.53 -0.06 !"#$%&'($"* 0.21 0.52 0.30 15.59   0.49 0.52 0.03 0.37 
Predicted Determinants of Backdating A"BC$'DA$(8* 0.34 0.63 0.29 11.56 
 
0.50 0.63 0.13 3.81 A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.30 0.61 0.31 13.11 
 
0.45 0.61 0.15 5.18 A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.27 0.58 0.31 13.43 
 
0.41 0.58 0.17 5.86 
          Panel B: Comparison of companies linked to a backdating company (LawFirmLink =1) to 
companies that are not linked to a backdating company (LawFirmLink=0) 
          
 
Difference in Means   After Propensity Score Matching 
 
(N = 13,912) 
 
On LawFirmLinkt (N = 13,774) A"BC$'DA$(8* 0 1 Diff. t-stat.   0 1 Diff. t-stat. 
Matched Control Variables  J$KL*-. 5.66 6.07 0.41 9.63 
 
5.90 6.05 0.15 0.57 N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.10 0.20 0.09 15.74 
 
0.19 0.19 -0.01 -0.17 QR9$:&'* 0.87 0.93 0.05 13.39 
 
0.94 0.93 -0.01 0.34 S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.18 0.32 0.15 31.77 
 
0.33 0.32 -0.01 0.08 U'$7LV&#* 3.38 3.97 0.59 11.70 
 
4.20 3.92 -0.28 0.70 !"#$%&'($"* 0.13 0.40 0.27 39.64   0.41 0.39 -0.02 -0.12 
Dependent Variable and Other LawFirmLink Measures 6"789":$(;* 0.0193 0.0607 0.04 11.56 
 
0.0325 0.0593 0.03 5.62 A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.00 0.88 0.88 259.01 
 
0.00 0.88 0.88 257.66 A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.00 0.81 0.81 192.23 
 
0.00 0.81 0.81 191.01 
This table provides descriptive statistics for key variables in our regressions before and after matching. 
Panel A is based on matching backdating and non-backdating (Backdatingt = 1 or 0) company-years on the 
control variables, and Panel B is based on matching linked and non-linked (LawFirmLinkt = 1 or 0) 
company-years on the control variables. We carry out the matching within each year in the sample (1997 to 
2006) and report t-statistics adjusted for year fixed effects. For the matched samples we report means and 





Logistic Regressions of the relation between backdating and law firm links 
 
  Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*) 
  
Propensity Matching on Backdating 
Characteristics (Table 6 Panel A)  
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) A"BC$'DA$(8*	(+)  1.190***   0.450***         0.426***         
  (0.097)   (0.110)         (0.110)         A"BC$'DA$(8**	(+)        0.589***         0.578***      
        (0.109)         (0.109)      A"BC$'DA$(8**-.	(+)           0.632***         0.629***   
           (0.108)         (0.107)   J$KL*-.   0.292***   0.291***   0.291***  -0.026 -0.029  -0.028   
   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   N$;ℎPL7ℎ*   0.562***   0.545***   0.541***   0.096   0.073   0.069   
   (0.118)   (0.118)   (0.118)   (0.114)   (0.114)   (0.114)   QR9$:&'*   0.337   0.324   0.322  -0.300 -0.310  -0.294   
   (0.245)   (0.245)   (0.245)   (0.247)   (0.247)   (0.247)   S$FT!"Fℎ*-.   0.620***   0.562***   0.555***  -0.07 -0.131  -0.152   
   (0.200)   (0.201)   (0.201)   (0.193)   (0.195)   (0.195)   U'$7LV&#*   0.030***   0.030***   0.031***  -0.0002 -0.00003  0.0002   
   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   !"#$%&'($"*   0.995***   0.950***   0.947***  -0.118 -0.167  -0.162        (0.109)   (0.109)   (0.108)   (0.106)   (0.107)   (0.106)   (Intercept)   -3.929***   -7.206***   -7.187***   -7.137***   -3.423***   -3.393***   -3.379***   
  (0.077)   (0.385)   (0.385)   (0.385)   (0.399)   (0.399)   (0.399)   Year fixed effects  N   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
Observations  13,912  13,912   13,912   13,912   10,321   10,321   10,321   
McFadden R2  0.038 0.127 0.130 0.132 0.021 0.025 0.026 
Odds ratios               
LawFirmLink 3.287 1.568 1.802 1.881 1.531 1.782 1.876 
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 1 with and without propensity score matching and for three variations of the 
LawFirmLink variable. Estimated coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. The sample comprises Compustat 
company-years between 1997 and 2006 inclusive during which unscheduled stock options were granted to CEOs, for which law 
firms could be identified, and for which data for estimating the regression model is available. A summary of our sample selection 
is at Table 1, and variable definitions are provided at Table 5. For columns 5 to 7, propensity score matching between backdating 
and non-backdating company-years is carried out for each model. The regressions are weighted using the weights from the 
matching procedure, and are estimated using quasibinomial link functions. Non-backdating observations outside the support of the 







Analysis of whether the likelihood of backdating varies with law firm size (Panel A) and 
whether the backdating company is from a different industry (Panel B) 
Panel A: Backdating and law firm size 		 		 		
 Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*)	
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
 Full Full Exclude LF Outlier Small LF Large LF A"BC$'DA$(8*	(+)     0.349***   0.296**    0.975***   0.436***  
       (0.133)   (0.118)    (0.199)   (0.158)  A"BC$'DJ$KL*  0.127***   0.052            
    (0.042)   (0.051)            
(Intercept)   -3.552***   -3.462***   -3.592***    -1.693*   -3.195***  
    (0.399)   (0.401)   (0.426)    (0.891)   (0.495)  
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations   10,321   10,321   9,197    3,674   5,371  
McFadden R2  0.019 0.021 0.019 0.032 0.018 
Odds ratios           
LawFirmLinkt  1.418 1.344 2.651 1.547 
LawFirmSizet 1.135 1.053       
Panel B: Law firm links conditional on industries being different 
	 Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*) 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  ACA$(8S$%%Z(9*	(+)  0.408***         
  (0.109)         ACA$(8S$%%Z(9**	(+)     0.550***      
     (0.108)      ACA$(8S$%%Z(9**-.	(+)        0.603***   
          (0.107)   
(Intercept)   -3.433***   -3.406***   -3.387***   
    (0.400)   (0.400)   (0.400)   
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y 
Observations   10,321   10,321   10,321   
McFadden R2  0.021 0.024 0.025 
Odds ratios: LFLinkDiffInd 1.504 1.733 1.828 
Notes: Propensity score matching between backdating and non-backdating company-years is carried out for 
each model (see Table 6 Panel A). The regressions are weighted using the weights from the matching 
procedure, and are estimated using quasibinomial link functions. Panel A examines the impact of law firm 
size on our findings. In column 3, company-years represented by the law firm with the highest number of 
backdating clients are omitted. In columns 4 and 5, the samples are restricted to company-years with above 
and below the median LawFirmSize each year. In Panel B, we replace LawFirmLink with LFLinkDiffInd, 
which are defined in the same way as LawFirmLink but take the value of one only if the focal company is 
linked via a law firm to a backdater with a different two-digit SIC. Estimated coefficients are presented with 





The relation between backdating and law firm links and director links 
 
Panel A: Comparison of backdating and non-backdating companies for sample with director links  
 
Means before matching   Weighted means after matching 
 
(N = 4,671) 
 
(N = 3,776) 6"789":$(;* 0 1 Diff. t-stat.   0 1 Diff. t-stat. S$'A$(8* 0.12 0.20 0.09 3.53 
 
0.18 0.20 0.03 0.44 A"BC$'DA$(8* 0.36 0.64 0.28 7.67 
 
0.56 0.64 0.08 1.42 A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.31 0.61 0.30 8.53 
 
0.52 0.61 0.10 2.09 A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.29 0.60 0.31 9.12 
 
0.47 0.60 0.13 2.86 J$KL*-. 7.29 7.50 0.21 1.69 
 
7.53 7.50 -0.04 -0.21 N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.09 0.27 0.18 8.19 
 
0.21 0.27 0.06 1.76 QR9$:&'* 0.98 0.98 0.00 -0.11 
 
0.98 0.98 0.00 0.64 S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.15 0.31 0.17 11.71 
 
0.32 0.31 -0.01 -0.62 U'$7LV&#* 4.91 6.51 1.60 5.34 
 
7.20 6.51 -0.69 0.11 !"#$%&'($"* 0.19 0.54 0.35 12.33   0.54 0.54 0.00 -0.55 
Panel B: Impact of director links on backdating   
 Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) S$'A$(8*  0.110   0.104   0.085   0.095   
    (0.182)   (0.181)   (0.181)   (0.181)   A"BC$'DA$(8*	(+)     0.311*      
     (0.167)      A"BC$'DA$(8**	(+)        0.424***   
        (0.163)   A"BC$'DA$(8**-.	(+)           0.551***   
             (0.162)   
(Intercept)   -3.684***   -3.695***   -3.668***   -3.676***   
    (0.752)   (0.745)   (0.743)   (0.741)   
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations   3,776   3,776   3,776   3,776   
McFadden R2  0.021 0.023 0.025 0.028 
Odds ratios         
DirLink  1.116 1.110 1.089 1.100 
LawFirmLink   1.365 1.528 1.735 
This table examines the impact of director links on our findings. S$'A$(8)* is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if at least one of company i’s directors at t was on the board of another company during t 
or earlier in a year that it backdated, and zero otherwise, and is constructed based on data beginning in 
1996. Panel A reports the results of propensity score matching between backdating and non-backdating 
company-years each year. We carry out the matching within each year in the sample (1997 to 2006) and 
report t-statistics adjusted for year fixed effects. For the matched sample we report means and t-statistics 
weighted according to the output of the matching procedure. Panel B reports the results from estimating 
Equation 2, with propensity score matching. The data is restricted to observations with board member 
data available. The p-values are labeled as follows: * if p < 0.1, ** if p < 0.05, and *** if p < 0.01. 
 56 
Table 10 
The relation between backdating and law firm links with inclusion of geographic links 
and director links 
Panel A: Matching backdating and non-backdating companies on the control variables 
 
Means before matching   Weighted means after matching 
 
(N = 13,707) 
 
(N = 10,186) 6"789":$(;* 0 1 Diff. t-stat.   0 1 Diff. t-stat. WL&A$(8* 0.28 0.54 0.25 11.03 
 
0.42 0.54 0.12 4.00 A"BC$'DA$(8* 0.34 0.64 0.30 11.74 
 
0.50 0.64 0.13 3.87 A"BC$'DA$(8** 0.30 0.61 0.31 13.24 
 
0.47 0.61 0.15 4.87 A"BC$'DA$(8**-. 0.27 0.59 0.31 13.53 
 
0.42 0.59 0.17 5.83 J$KL*-. 5.76 6.87 1.11 12.37 
 
6.91 6.87 -0.04 -0.79 N$;ℎPL7ℎ* 0.13 0.26 0.13 7.98 
 
0.23 0.26 0.03 1.15 QR9$:&'* 0.89 0.96 0.07 5.38 
 
0.97 0.96 -0.01 -1.87 S$FT!"Fℎ*-. 0.22 0.34 0.11 8.42 
 
0.31 0.34 0.03 0.75 U'$7LV&#* 3.53 5.33 1.80 10.57 
 
5.80 5.33 -0.48 0.34 !"#$%&'($"* 0.22 0.53 0.31 15.70   0.50 0.53 0.02 0.23 
Panel B: Impact of geographic and director links on backdating  
 Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) WL&A$(8*  0.420***   0.369***   0.367***   0.362***    0.360**   
    (0.104)   (0.104)   (0.104)   (0.104)    (0.154)   A"BC$'DA$(8*	(+)     0.400***          
     (0.113)          A"BC$'DA$(8**	(+)        0.522***       
        (0.111)       A"BC$'DA$(8**-.	(+)           0.612***    0.547***   
             (0.110)    (0.161)   S$'A$(8*      0.074           (0.182)   (Intercept)   -3.378***   -3.298***   -3.269***   -3.253***    -3.648***   
    (0.402)   (0.402)   (0.402)   (0.402)    (0.742)   
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations   10,186   10,186   10,186   10,186    3,727   
McFadden R2  0.022 0.026 0.028 0.031 0.033 
Odds ratios           
GeoLink  1.522 1.446 1.443 1.436 1.433 
LawFirmLink  1.492 1.685 1.844 1.728 DirLink     1.077 Notes: . WL&A$(8* is a dummy variable equal to one if the city in which company i is located at t is also the 
location of company j during t or earlier in a year that j backdated, and zero otherwise. WL&A$(8*  is 
constructed based on data beginning in 1996.  Panel A reports the results of propensity score matching 
between backdating and non-backdating company-years each year. We carry out the matching within each 
year in the sample (1997 to 2006) and report t-statistics adjusted for year fixed effects. For the matched 
sample we report means and t-statistics weighted according to the output of the matching procedure. The p-




The relation between backdating and law firm links: the impact of selection 
 
  Logistic regressions (dependent variable: 6"789":$(;)*) 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) A"BC$'DA$(8*	(+)  0.467***   0.492***               
  (0.116)   (0.129)               A"BC$'DA$(8**	(+)        0.560***   0.634***         
        (0.115)   (0.127)         A"BC$'DA$(8**-.	(+)              0.609***   0.654***   
              (0.113)   (0.125)   AC!ℎ"(;L*  0.070   0.036   0.136   0.117   0.050   0.015   
  (0.233)   (0.235)   (0.224)   (0.226)   (0.219)   (0.220)   A"BC$'DA$(8*	×	AC!ℎ"(;L* -0.146 -0.151              
  (0.298)   (0.300)               A"BC$'DA$(8**	×	AC!ℎ"(;L*       -0.276 -0.312        
        (0.294)   (0.296)         A"BC$'DA$(8**-.	×	AC!ℎ"(;L*             -0.108  -0.099   
              (0.293)   (0.295)   (Intercept)   -3.090***   -2.410***   -3.126***   -2.403***   -3.135***   -2.409***   
  (0.094)   (0.477)   (0.091)   (0.478)   (0.088)   (0.477)   Control variables  N   Y   N   Y   N   Y 
Year fixed effects  N   Y   N   Y   N   Y 
Observations   7,167   7,167   7,167   7,167   7,167   7,167   
McFadden R2  0.006 0.015 0.008 0.018 0.011 0.020 
Odds ratios             
LawFirmLink 1.595 1.636 1.751 1.885 1.839 1.923 
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 1 for three variations of the LawFirmLink variable, 
with the addition of LFChanget and the interactions between LFChanget and LawFirmLink. LFChanget 
equals one if at least one of company i’s law firms at t did not represent i in a prior year; 13.4% of 
company-years in this sample had LFChanget equal to one. The sample is the same as in the main 
regression analyses, except that for each company-year we require the availability of law firm data in a 
prior year. As before, propensity score matching is carried out each year to match backdating and non-
backdating observations. Estimated coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses.  Other 
variable definitions are at Table 5. The p-values are labeled as follows: * if p < 0.1, * if p < 0.05, and *** 





The likelihood of a “lucky grant” in companies that did not have a backdating 
restatement but shared a law firms (LF) with a backdating company 
 
      
Panel A: All company-years (N = 15,236)   
      
  Backdating-related restatement years 
Other years with 
option grants 
Lucky 162 2,525 
Not lucky 313 12,236 
% lucky 34.1% 17.1% 
χ2 test p-value <1%   
      
      
Panel B: Clean Companies:  No backdating restatements (N = 14,628) 
      
  LF had backdating clients LF had no backdating clients 
Lucky 1,107 1,368 
Not lucky 5,110 7,043 
% lucky 17.8% 16.3% 
χ2 test p-value 1.48%   
      
      
Panel C: Clean Companies:  No backdating restatements (N = 14,628) 
      
  More than 4% of LF's clients backdated 
Less than 4% of 
LF's clients backdated 
Lucky 791 1,684 
Not lucky 3,406 8,747 
% lucky 18.8% 16.1% 
χ2 test p-value <1%   
      
      
Panel D: Clean Companies that use large law firms:  No backdating restatements (N = 4,426) 
      
  More than 4% of LF's clients backdated 
Less than 4% of 
LF's clients backdated 
Lucky 528 272 
Not lucky 2,126 1,500 
% lucky 19.9% 15.3% 
χ2 test p-value <1%   
      
This table is based on the 15,236 company-years between 1997 and 2006 during which CEO grants 
occurred, and for which law firm data is available. A company-year is lucky if a CEO grant date had 
one of the two lowest closing prices for the period beginning (ending) ten trading days before (after) 
the grant date. If a company-year has only one grant date, the probability that it is lucky by chance 
alone is then 2 / 21 = 9.5%. Because some company-years have more than one grant date, the average 
number of grants per year in our sample is 1.27. If grant dates are randomly and independently 
assigned, the probability that a company-year is lucky by chance alone is 1.27 × 9.5% = 12.1%. Panels 
A to D show contingency tables that give the number of company-years that are lucky or not lucky 
(rows) for specific subsamples. In Panel A, the columns are based on whether a company-year had a 
backdating-related restatement; in Panel B, the columns are based on whether the company-year had a 
law firm that represented a backdating client; and in Panels C and D columns are based on whether the 
company-year had a law firm for which over 4% of clients had a backdating-related restatement. Panel 
A, Panels B and C, and Panel D are respectively based on the full sample, the sample of companies 
that did not restate at any year of the sample period, and non-restating companies that use one of the 
23 large law firms (with more than 40 unique clients during the sample period – see Figure 3).  
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Figure 1 
Distributions of backdating start and end years 
 
 
The figure shows backdating start and end years in red and light blue respectively, for the 123 
backdating companies in our sample. Beginning with AuditAnalytics’ Non-Reliance Restatements 
database, we restrict the data to restatements involving options backdating, which are coded by 
AuditAnalytics as category 48 restatements. For each company that filed backdating-related 
restatements, we define the start and end of its backdating period as the start and end dates of the 
period for which it is restating (res_begin_date and res_end_date). The 123 companies began 
backdating between January 1990 and October 2005, and ended backdating between September 2002 








The All companies sample of 4,671 includes the 119 backdating companies.  Figure 2 is restricted 







Distribution of backdating clients among large law and audit firms 
 
Panel A: Large law firms    Panel B: Large audit firms 
 
 
Panel C: Large law firms, CA clients         Panel D: Large audit firms, CA clients 
 
Panels A to D show the proportions of each large law or audit firm’s clients that backdated during the 
sample period. The figures are based on the sample of company-years for which law firms could be 
identified (N = 15,236). In Panel B we further require availability of audit firm data from Compustat 
and drop firms coded as unaudited (N = 14,161), and in Panels C and D the data is further restricted to 
companies in California (N = 3,278 and 3,182 respectively). We compute the total number of unique 
clients an audit or law firm had over the sample period, and identify whether a client had backdated at 
a year in which it was linked to the audit or law firm. The dashed lines show the expected proportions 
of backdating clients per large law or audit firm, defined as the proportion of all unique clients of large 
law firms or large audit firms that backdated at some point during the sample period. We examine the 
difference in proportion of clients backdating over the large law firms and audit firms respectively 
using chi-squared tests. The p-value of the chi-squared tests are computed using Monte Carlo tests 
(Hope, 1968) with 100,000 replicates.  
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Figure 4 
Law firm links between the 123 backdating companies throughout the sample period 
 
Panel A: Kamada-Kawai algorithm 
 
Panel B: Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm 
  
These network diagrams show the law firm links between the 123 companies that backdated at any 
time in the sample period. A directed link from node i to node j indicates that j's law firm represented i 
in t or earlier.  The links are constructed using data beginning in 1996, when EDGAR filing was fully 
phased in. The size of each node is based on the average size of the company during the sample period. 
The network diagram in Panel A is drawn based on the Kamada and Kawai (1989) algorithm, which 
positions nodes on a diagram based on the shortest paths between nodes. The network diagram in 
Panel B is drawn based on the Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) algorithm, which positions nodes on 




Law firm links between backdating companies by year (Kamada-Kawai algorithm) 
 
The figures show the largest connected component of the network of backdating companies depicted 
in Figure 4, restricted to nodes that had entered the sample by specific years. Nodes are colored red if 
the company had backdated by t, and light blue otherwise.  The links are constructed based on data up 
to each year t.  
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Figure 6 
Law firm links between backdating companies and randomly-selected companies 
 
 
The panels show law firm links between companies in the sample in 2003, 2004, and 2005 for backdating and 
randomly-selected companies. A directed link from node i to node j indicates that j's law firm represented i in t or 
earlier.  The networks are drawn using the Kamada and Kawai (1989) algorithm, the size of the nodes are based 
on company size, and red (light blue) nodes correspond to companies that backdated (did not backdate) that year. 
